enterprise size and industry concentration (Brown, Ickes and Ryterman 1994) . We demonstrate that, relative to the United States, Russia has more medium and large manufacturing enterprises, few extra-large manufacturing enterprises and almost no small manufacturing enterprises. While few Russian enterprises are monopolists at the national level, many enterprises operate in highly segmented markets and are thus able to exercise market power. This paper extends the analysis to labor markets. While enterprises will lose their monopoly power as distribution improves, low labor mobility and small labor markets will allow many firms to remain monopsonists in their labor markets, thus creating barriers to adjustment.
Russian Labor Market in Transition
Labor is highly immobile in Russia relative to western market economies. The Soviet legacy of internal passports and legal restrictions that prohibited people from moving has had a significant impact on people's habits and expectations concerning mobility. The Soviet legacy of utilizing reciprocity or social networks, for meeting many of their household needs remains. Russians are reluctant to change jobs if the move jeopardizes their social networks. Rose (1993) utilizes recent survey evidence from three transitional economies, including Russia, to document nine types of economies that exist for the production or exchange of goods and services. Four are social or non-monetized economies that depend upon reciprocal relationships between people in the same locality or enterprise. In Russia, for example, 96% of the respondents reported involvement in at least one of the social economies (more than one quarter regularly rely on help from friends and relatives; more than one-third reported that they use connections to provide or receive goods without cash payment). '
The Soviet legacy of housing and transportation shortages also impedes labor mobility. Privatizing residential units may alleviate this problem, but construction of new housing is also required. The poor system of transportation is an impediment to households wishing to move their belongings; transport difficulties makes visiting family and friends in other cities and, even commuting to work in nearby localities, an obstacle. The information constraint to labor mobility is declining as advertising and yellow pagestype publications emerge.
Changes in ownership and decision-making structures of workplaces will influence the Russian labor market. First, there will be intra-industry adjustment as firms identify and exploit their comparative advantage (Ickes and Ryterman 1993) . Firms investing in new technologies and equipment and thus altering their labor requirements will cause movements of labor between firms within industries. Inter-industry adjustment, for example, growth in the service sector of the economy relative to manufacturing will impact on the labor market as will the shift in relative output shares between heavy industries and consumer goods. Finally, as a market economy emerges in Russia, we would expect an adjustment in the size distribution of$rrns, resulting in a greater proportion of the workforce employed by smaller firms. Table 1 illustrates the difference in the size distribution of civilian manufacturing enterprises in Russia and the United States. Almost 88% of U.S. firms employ fewer than 50 people while only 10% of Russian enterprises fall in this category. U.S. firms with fewer than 250 workers employ 27% of the industrial workforce, while those in Russia employ less than 6 % . Small firms are often the source of innovation. Yet, a significant percentage of small firms fail. As Russia becomes a market economy, entry of new, small firms increase responsiveness to consumer commands and increase the likelihood of innovation.
Findings and Implications
How does the impact of the transition on industrial structure in Russia influence local labor markets, regional labor markets, and employment in small and large firms? Table 2 documents the number of enterprises or industries by city. Almost half of Russian cities are one-company towns; 76% of the cities have four or fewer companies; 92% have 10 or fewer. The Soviet legacy of monopsony continues to dominate industrial employment alternatives. This situation is compounded by restricted labor mobility. If enterprises in the Military Industrial Complex (MIC) were included, the number would be even more dramatic.
Local Labor Markets
In practice, the results of monopsony power in the labor market will depend on the degree of control-de facto through share ownership or dejure through political power-the local government has over the decision making of the enterprise. Enterprise overstaffing in Russia implies that level of employment at the time of privatization is even higher than the competitive level. Thus, privatization could lead to high unemployment in onecompany towns.
If workers form unions to bargain over wages and employment, they may improve their position. The outcome will depend upon whether the workers form a union before or after labor shedding occurs and whether the union represents all workers in the community or is limited to the workers in an enterprise. Even without a union or collective, workers may be able to respond to the monopsony power by exercising control afforded them through share ownership as a result of privatization. The union and worker-ownershipoption raise two related concerns. First, unions or worker-ownership may slow the restructuring process if shortterm concessions are granted at the expense of necessary investments for profitability in the long run. Second, a high priority to job security could deter improvements of labor mobility. Encouraging labor immobility could adversely affect long-term profitability. Table 3 illustrates the Russian employment situation by industrial branches and by region. Likely trouble spots are indicated in the table by boxes in which both numbers are high, meaning that not only is the branch very important to the region, but also that the region is very important to the branch. See for example the lumber branch in the North Region: lumber accounts for 26.1 % of industrial employment in the North, and this region accounts for 19.2%of total employment in lumber industries. Table 3 , which excludes MIC industries, suggests that branches are evenly distributed across regions, thus a branch-specific negative shock is less likely to fall disproportionately on one region. This is good news for regional labor markets, especially if intra-industry adjustment causes labor to move inter-industry. Such labor mobility depends on the skill complementarities of jobs and occupations between industries: if industry-specific skills dominate, interindustry mobility will require retraining. Table 4 identifies the variation across regions of industrial concentration. In the North Region, for example, regional monopolies-one enterprise in that industry in that region-characterize 38.2% of all industries, and account for 4.7% of civilian industrial enterprises, employing 19.6% of civilian industrial workforce. Industries with four or fewer enterprises account for 68.4% of all industries, 14.2%of civilian industrial enterprises, and 36.9% of civilian industrial employment. In the Central Region, on the other hand, regional monopolies account for only 1.7% of civilian industrial employment.
Regional Labor Markets
Regional concentration translates into market power. As the only supplier in the region, monopolists survive during transition, insulating their workers against job loss. If regional concentration diminishes and firms fail, workers must move out of their region, move to another industry, or face permanent unemployment. 
Employment in Small and Large Firms
Conventional wisdom suggests that transition will increase the share of industrial employment in small firms. Small firms are likely privately owned new entrants, while large firms are likely to be recently privatized (employee-owned) or state-owned.
In market economies, large firms are typically associated with greater job security than small firms (Brown, Hamilton and Medoff 1990) . Small firms have higher mortality rates and account for more layoffs. In the Russian transition economy, as the structure of industry adjusts, there will be a net job gain in small firms despite high turnover rates of new private firms. Also, as the large privatized enterprises restructure, they will account for a large share of layoffs.
Large U.S. firms compensate their employees better than small firms: these firms pay a 10-15 % wage premium and provide workers much more generous benefits packages. In Russia, firm size does not explain differentials in wages or benefits (Commander 1993 , Standing 1992 , Commander and Jackman 1993 . Firm ownership may be a significant explanatory variable. Privatized firms are shedding housing and other services which they provided as a state-owned enterprise. Currently, there is no clear signal regarding the relative provision of benefits between small and large firms in Russia, nor is there any clear signal regarding the quality of working conditions across firm size or firm ownership.
From the workers' perspective, small private firms might be viewed as risky because of their potentially higher exit rate. If workers perceive differences in wages and the quality of working conditions as insignificant, they will be reluctant to make the moves necessary for industry adjustment. The question is whether workers perceive these differences.
Conclusion
This paper suggests that several features of the Soviet economy continue to contribute to the immobility of workers in the Russian labor market. Privatization will not immediately alter enterprises' monopsonist position in the relevant labor market. Movement of labor between industries rather than just between firms within industries will be required for the transition to a market economy to succeed. Once the transition is complete, a larger share of industrial workers will be employed in small firms. More research is needed on the nature of skill and job complementarities within and between industries and how this will impact restructuring and adjustment.
